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Abstract 
The sciences of cognition, going back to the early days of the 
Artificial Intelligence movement in the 1950s, were typically 
viewed with profound suspicion or distaste by thinkers, 
Marxist and other, for whom the embeddedness of human 
beings in the symbolic realm of representations and values 
was a sine qua non condition of any legitimate theory – 
whether ethical, political, metaphysical. Attempts to locate 
mind and action within the natural world studied by the 
natural sciences, in this case by neuroscience, were viewed as 
at best conceptual justifications for de-humanizing, secret 
military projects. The fact that in recent years the sciences of 
cognition have had a ‘social turn’ (“social cognition,” “social 
neuroscience,” “affective neuroscience,” “collective 
intentionality” and so forth) does little to assuage the fears of 
the engagé, anti-naturalist thinker. In contrast, I propose a 
historic-philosophical reconstruction of a ‘Spinozist’ tradition 
which locates the brain within the broader network of 
relations, including social relations. This tradition runs from 
Spinoza to Marx and Lev Vygotski in the early 20th century, 
and on to Toni Negri and Paolo Virno in recent European 
philosophy, as a new perspective on the brain. The concept of 
social brain that is articulated in this reconstruction – some 
early-20th century Soviet neuropsychologists spoke of the 
“socialist cortex” – overcomes distinctions between 
Continental thought and the philosophy of mind (and its 
ancillary, cognitive science), and possibly gives a new 
metaphysical framework for social cognition.  
Keywords: social brain; Spinoza; Vygotski 
 
There have been lots of discussions of social intellect and 
even social cognition in recent decades, which brought 
about a significant change in what might have otherwise 
been a very ‘individualist’ discipline, with a new focus on 
imitation, empathy, ‘mind-reading’, and even group 
cognition. And claims that the mind or intellect is by 
essence social go back a long ways – consider Locke’s 
statement that “I have always thought the Actions of Men 
the best Interpreters of their thoughts,”1 a position which 
reaches its mature expression in the pragmatist 
understanding of mind as a set of practices within the world 
of action, but also in the different forms of behaviorism 
(psychological and logical); in the philosophy of the later 
Wittgenstein, or in Heidegger-as-read-by-Hubert-Dreyfus, 
and ‘ecological’ thinking à la J.J. Gibson.2 
But I will be interested in a different locus of the social 
here: the brain. And differently from the newly emerged 
                                                           
1 Locke (1975), I.iii.3. 
2 See Losonsky (2001), pp. 8-9; Clark (1997), (2002). 
field of social neuroscience, the social brain I shall discuss 
here might also be called ‘The Spinozist Brain’ or, in a more 
mysterious formulation, from a 1920s Bolshevik 
psychologist, Aaron Zalkind, ‘The Socialist Cortex’. I shall 
clarify this expression later on, but for now would 
emphasize the Spinozist dimension. That is, I wish to 
reconstruct a tradition of thinking about the brain as social 
which is ultimately Spinozist in nature, via Marx, Lev 
Vygotski and the contemporary philosopher Antonio Negri. 
One of the points I will make in light of this reconstruction 
is that the Marxist hostility to cognitive science might have 
to be reconsidered to some extent. (Marx himself uses the 
expression ‘social brain’.3) Or, put differently, that an 
incidental accomplishment of the presentation of this 
tradition should be to make it harder for politically 
motivated critiques of cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence to make it seem as if theories of intellect and 
action that sought to involve the brain necessarily had to be 
individualistic, ‘reactionary’, in the service of the military-
industrial complex, and so forth.4 
Obviously not all ‘social brains’ or rather their 
conceptualizations, are equal. Social epistemology, primacy 
of emotions and the importance of ‘common notions’ are 
not all the same. The ‘social’ dimension being emphasized 
in the discussions of ‘social intellect’,5 which culminated in 
the notion of ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ and its presence 
in the primate world, is that of the individual’s capacity to 
interact successfully with social groups, to predict and 
manipulate behavior, to make and break promises, and so 
forth. The energetic demands of such a complex situation 
are ultimately presented as responsible for the large size of 
primates’ brains, so that some evolutionary anthropologists 
and their collaborators in related fields took to calling the 
Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis, the ‘social brain 
hypothesis’.6 
The ‘social’ in ‘social epistemology’ focuses on the 
reliability of collective states of mind, whereas the social in 
‘social cognition’ focuses notably on mirror neurons, which 
                                                           
3 Marx (1973), pp. 694, 709. 
4 The most eloquent version of this slightly paranoid critique 
(and the Rand Corporation, DARPA and others will keep such 
theorists busy for generations to come) is the long, anonymous text 
entitled “L’hypothèse cybernétique,” in the post-Situationist 
journal  Tiqqun  2 (2001), p. 40f. 
5 Humphrey, “The social function of intellect” (1976), reprinted 
in Byrne & Whiten, eds. (1988); see also the sequel, Whiten & 
Byrne, eds. (1997). 
6 Brothers (1990); Dunbar (1998), Dunbar et al. (Eds.) (2009). 
ASCS09: Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science 
Article DOI: 10.5096/ASCS200956 367 
indicate the existence in the brain of a particular recognition 
or decoding of action and thus of the imitation of action,7 
indicating an understanding of other people’s intentions, 
goals and desires. Mirror neurons, found in the ventral 
premotor cortex of macaque monkeys, are activated both 
when the monkey executes grasping actions (e.g. grasping a 
peanut) and when it observes someone else (or another 
monkey) making grasping actions, or even the preparation 
of a motor act. Mirror neurons appear to distinguish 
between biological and nonbiological actions, responding 
only to the observation of hand-object interactions and not 
to the same action if performed by a mechanical tool, such 
as a pair of pliers.8 
Imitation had already been pinpointed in the late 
nineteenth century by Baldwin (of ‘Baldwin effect’ fame): 
“By imitation the little animal picks up directly the example, 
instruction, mode of life, etc. of his private family circle and 
species.”9 And in the 1920s the great reformer John Dewey 
extensively elaborated an account of the social basis of 
mind. Since the early Nineties Cacioppo and Berntson have 
used the term ‘social neuroscience’ to describe their work, 
but this has rather little to do with our interest in the social 
brain, as the focus seems to be chiefly on correlations 
between neural states and behavior.10 Similarly with studies 
of the culturally and socially constructed nature of the brain, 
or the focus on its necessarily ‘networked’ dimension 
(‘mind-like properties of social groups’, as Hutchins says);11 
they do not make ontological claims about the brain itself. 
Under the influence of J.J. Gibson, an influential paper by 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers, and in a different vein the 
‘enactivist’ approach to cognition proposed by Varela and 
others, ‘ethological’ and ‘ecological’ approach to the study 
of brain, body and mind have become mainstream; they are 
simply part of the framework for understanding the behavior 
of an organism. But the environment that’s studied there 
still tends to be viewed in terms of stimulus and response 
(the red spot of paint that the little bird pecks at, and so 
forth), and not in terms of the symbolic world, the 
historically, socially and culturally determined world of 
representations, of role-playing, of recognition in which we 
actually live and act. But rather than seek to broker 
agreement between various schools of thought, or retreat 
                                                           
7 Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti (2004), Goldman (2005). 
Goldman has even co-authored papers with Gallese, on how mirror 
neurons help put the new concept of ‘mind-reading’ on solid 
footing. See Gallese & Goldman (1998). A major anthology on 
imitation is Hurley and Chater (Eds.) (2005), which includes 
discussion of Alex, Irene Pepperberg’s much-regretted African 
grey parrot. 
8 Blakemore, Winston & Frith (2004), p. 217; Gallese, Keysers 
& Rizzolatti (2004), p. 397. 
9 Baldwin (1896), p. 440; Depew, “Baldwin and his many 
effects,” in Depew & Weber, eds. (2003), p. 7. I won’t be able to 
discuss Baldwin in this paper but his views concerning language as 
a supplemental level beyond Darwinian evolution offer intriguing 
resonances with Vygotski and Negri. 
10 See e.g. Cacioppo & Berntson (2004a, 2004b). 
11 E.g., Alač (2008) and Hutchins (1995). 
behind the safe posture of the intellectual historian relating 
the discovery of the ‘fact’ that our selves or minds, which 
turn out to be our brains, are socially produced and perhaps 
determined, I would, as indicated above, like to analyze a 
tradition out of which a unique concept, ‘the social brain’, 
has emerged, from the post-Cartesian metaphysics of 
Spinoza to its neurological and Marxist reprisals in 
Vygotski and Negri. 
This will not however be a study in the history of 
Marxism – suffice it to say that the concept of social brain 
appears in various passages in the works of the ‘autonomist’ 
Italian Marxist thinkers Toni Negri and Paolo Virno, where 
they use it synonymously with the even more mysterious 
expression “General Intellect,” derived from the so-called 
‘Fragment on Machines’ in Marx’s Grundrisse, his 
notebooks of the late 1850s which Negri ‘rediscovered’ as a 
source for another, heterodox Marxism in celebrated 
lectures given at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris in 
the late 1970s, at the invitation of Louis Althusser.12 The 
Spinozist tradition of the social brain runs concurrently 
from Spinoza to Marx and his reinterpretation by Negri, and 
from Spinoza to the neuropsychologists Lev Semenovich 
Vygotski and Alexander Romanovich Luria in Russia in the 
1920s-1930s.13 
The story could be extended to include both the 
‘coevolution’ approach to brain and language proposed by 
Terrence Deacon and, in a more ‘American’ and 
‘therapeutic’ vein, the type of ‘affective neuroscience’ 
proposed by Antonio Damasio. Indeed, claims about the 
embodied, embedded nature of cognition, or the ultimate 
‘commonness’ of its contents, are inseparable from an 
affective component, already in Spinoza (and Vygotski 
noticed this, authoring a manuscript on Spinoza’s theory of 
the emotions or ‘affects’ which was published 
posthumously14). 
I will proceed in three steps: first I’ll try to make explicit 
the Spinozist context for the social brain, secondly I shall 
summarize some key ideas of the ‘Russian school’ 
(Vygotski, Luria), and lastly point towards the ‘Italian’ 
moment of Negri and others. 
1. The Spinozist context 
In an important proposition of the Ethics, Spinoza declares 
that “The order and the connexion of ideas is the same as 
the order and the connexion of things.”15 Spinoza locates the 
individual within a world of relations; to be an individual is 
in fact nothing other than being a particular intersection in a 
                                                           
12 Negri (1984). For further background on Autonomia see the 
prefaces by Yann Moulier and Matteo Mandarini to Negri (1989) 
and (2005), and  Lotringer and Marazzi (Eds.) (1980/2007).  
13 The only work I am aware of which makes a connection 
between the autonomist Marxist theory of the ‘social brain’ and 
Vygotski’s landmark work at the intersection of social psychology, 
developmental psychology, linguistics and neuroscience is Virno 
(2001b), himself an actor in the former movement. 
14 Vygotski (1972). 
15 Spinoza (1676/1992), II, prop. 7 
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giant universe of relations. This is what it is to be a finite 
mode of an infinite substance. One might think of a 
connectionist model, a neural net in which particular links 
are reinforced. Spinoza adds that any such intersection, 
whether it is a stone, a Fanta can, an animal or me, strives to 
persevere in existence, as the finite mode it is.16 (This 
striving – the conatus – is frequently misread outside of 
Spinoza scholarship as being specifically ‘vital’ or 
‘biological’, including in Damasio’s version where it 
becomes a particular disposition of cerebral circuits such 
that an internal or external stimulus will induce them to seek 
out their well-being or survival.) The generalized character 
of the striving to remain one’s finite mode was nicely put by 
the eighteenth-century French materialist d’Holbach: 
All beings known to us tend to preserve themselves in 
the same way. The stone resists destruction by the 
strong adhesion of its parts. Organized beings preserve 
themselves in more complicated ways. . . . Physicists 
have named this tendency or striving, self-gravitation. 
Newton calls it inertia, and moralists discussing human 
beings call it self-love.17 
What this implies for Spinoza’s view of the ‘subject’ or 
‘agent’ is that she will not be defined by her interiority, by 
private mental states, a fortiori private and foundational 
mental states. An individual is a certain quantum of striving, 
and thereby a certain relation between different points in the 
total causal network. Exactly as a contemporary practitioner 
of ‘social’ or ‘affective’ neuroscience might have it, the 
passions are not properties of an essential human nature, or 
an isolated individual, but rather of a relational spectrum 
between a plurality of individuals.18 Instead of Descartes’ 
cogito ergo sum Spinoza says homo cogitat (Ethics II, 
axiom 2): there is no foundational self, but always a process 
– a network. 
Alexander Luria’s “monistic” critique of psychology is 
explicitly Spinozist.19 He thinks that both Feuerbachian 
materialism and psychoanalysis contribute to this monistic 
approach, unlike the ‘soul’-oriented tradition of 
philosophical psychology.20 In his view, psychology was too 
dualistic – either too mechanistic, with no recognition of 
activity, or too vitalistic, with no recognition of the causal 
(and thus deterministic) relations within which life, 
including mental life, takes place – and it has been this way 
at least since Descartes’ Passions of the Soul. Similarly, 
Vygotski proposed a Spinozist ‘reform’ of psychology, 
arguing that  
                                                           
16 Spinoza, (1676/1992), III, prop. VI.  
17 D’Holbach (1781/1990), I, pp. 82-83 (my translation). 
18 For a nice summary, see Morfino (2003), § 5 and Morfino 
(2006). 
19 Luria, “Psychoanalysis as Monistic Psychology” (1925), in 
Luria (1978). 
20 Vygotski disagreed with this essay for inappropriately trying 
to synthesize Freudianism and Marxism without acknowledging 
their specific differences. 
thinking is nothing other than a function of the brain. 
Mental life does not have an independent existence; 
following Spinoza’s definition, thinking is not a 
substance but an attribute. A ‘psychic’ [or ‘mental’ – 
CW] phenomenon does not exist in itself but is rather 
(…) a necessary moment in a complex psychophysical 
process.21 
The first Spinozist point was an ontological one, about the 
nature of the world as a total set of interconnections within 
which we find ourselves as embodied agents. The second 
Spinozist point is the non-independence of mind and brain 
with regard to this world. What is missing so far is the ‘self-
sculpting’ element, which falls under the heading of 
emotions or affects. Vygotski adds in another text that 
Spinoza […] was a determinist and, in contrast to the 
Stoics, claimed that man has power over his affects, that 
the intellect may change the order and connection of the 
passions and bring them into accord with the order and 
connections that are given in the intellect. Spinoza 
expressed a correct genetic relationship. In the process 
of ontogenetic development the human emotions get 
connected with general sets both in what regards the 
individual’s self-consciousness and in what regards his 
knowledge of reality.22 
This third point, acknowledging the ‘primacy’ of the 
affects, occurs in independent fashion in Vygotski, in Negri 
and in Damasio, each time with reference to Spinoza. For 
instance, it’s precisely inasmuch as we belong to a greater 
causal world that we are capable of effecting changes in 
ourselves and internalizing knowledge from the outside (this 
is also Spinoza’s doctrine of liberation as emendation). 
Now, given these three points, if we add a fourth and last 
one, it will take us to the ‘social brain’: it is the “common 
notions” we have which make our persons – and, Negri will 
add quite consistently, our brains – common. Common 
notions are conceptions of things “which are common to all” 
(Ethics II, prop. 38). There are common notions shared 
between bodies, and the more I ‘have’ or ‘know’ them, the 
more I have adequate knowledge of body, and more 
materialistically, the more my body has in common with 
other bodies, the more my mind is capable of perceiving 
things adequately (ibid., prop. 39). The common notions 
allow us to step beyond the consideration of singular things 
and see (some of) the greater network-machine beyond us: 
we then see how finite modes are produced by an infinite 
substance. Put differently, with reference to the affects: they 
are necessarily social, being about ‘otherness’ or 
‘exteriority’. For example, laughter and sobbing are 
distinctly human features activated by limbic structures; 
importantly, they are the first two social valorizations that 
children make, and they induce responses in others that are 
                                                           
21 Vygotski, “The genesis of higher mental functions,” quoted in 
Métraux (1992), p. 197 (my translation from the German). 
22 Vygotski, “On Psychological Systems,” in Vygotski (1997), 
p. 103. 
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highly predictive of emotional states.23 Let’s move now 
from the Spinozist context to what one Bolshevik child 
psychologist in the 1930s called the socialist cortex. 
2. The socialist cortex 
Given this Spinozist framework, the first real ‘pass’ towards 
the vision of the brain itself as social – of cerebral 
architecture as reflecting changes in the linguistic, social 
and cultural environments – was made by Lev Vygotski and 
his collaborator Alexander Luria in Russia in the 20s-30s. 
Vygotski died quite young but he managed to lay the 
foundations for a variety of fields of inquiry (he and Luria 
are founders of neuropsychology, along with Kurt 
Goldstein,24 and he is a first-rank figure in social 
psychology, linguistics and developmental psychology). 
Among the unpublished manuscripts he left behind, one was 
on Spinoza’s Doctrine of the Emotions, in light of but also 
as the basis for a ‘psychoneurology’. The context in which 
the ideas that concern us appear is the development of 
language in the child. It has powerful resonances with 
‘Baldwinian evolution’, an understanding of evolution 
which allows for behavioral adaptation to precede and 
condition major biological changes, so that when “useful 
behavior spreads within a population and becomes 
important for subsistence, it will generate selection 
pressures on generic traits that support its propagation,”25 or 
again, “that successful learners will do better in evolutionary 
competition even though what is learned is not inherited.”26 
Vygotski describes linguistic activity as necessarily 
intersubjective: learning a concept involves invoking it, 
linking it with the performance procedure and external 
information for which it stands. He calls this the “outside-
inside” principle, namely, that symbolic thought first 
represents external action, and only later becomes internal 
speech (i.e., thought).27 He argues that concepts and 
functions exist for the child first in the social or 
interpersonal sphere and only later are internalized as 
intrapsychic concepts. Contra Piaget in particular,28 
Vygotski argues that we don’t move from a solitary, 
‘autistic’ or ‘egocentric’ starting-point towards a gradual 
socialization, but rather from socialization towards 
individuality. In these different visions of child 
development, Piaget looks for universal laws of 
development, whereas Vygotski always stresses the plurality 
of social environments as an irreducible factor in 
development. But the lessons to be learned go beyond child 
psychology: 
 
                                                           
23 Deacon (1997), p. 419. 
24 Van der Veer (1997), p. 5. 
25 Deacon (1997), p. 345. 
26 Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005). 
27 Bargh (2005), p. 50; see Bruner’s introduction to Luria 
(1961); Donald (2001), p. 250. 
28 Chapter 2 of Thinking and Speech (formerly translated as 
Thought and Language) is devoted to Piaget, as is chapter 6, in 
part. 
Thus the central tendency of the child’s development is 
not a gradual socialization introduced from the outside, 
but a gradual individualization that emerges on the 
foundation of the child’s internal socialization.29 
In the Spinozist terms outlined above, we don’t compose 
the network(s), they compose us. So far, this is pretty well 
known – we’ve just restated the necessarily social character 
of mind or intelligence. Granted that the individual is social 
and cannot be defined without reference to social factors as 
primary as the relation of child to mother, what is new is 
something further, and tied to plasticity: there may even be 
evidence of consequences in our central nervous system 
derived from early social interaction. Past experience is 
embodied in synaptic modifications. The functional 
organization of the human brain can be said, in both the 
Vygotski-Luria sense and in Deacon’s sense, to reflect 
socially determined forms or types of activity. As Alexandre 
Métraux puts it, the origins of the higher psychological 
functions such as thinking, believing, wanting, etc. are not 
to be sought in the brain or some hidden spiritual entity 
called ‘spirit’ or ‘mind’, but in the activity of the members 
of a society.30 These higher functions, one can add, emerge 
out of “the dialectical interaction between specific 
biological structures (embodiment) and culture 
(situatedness) through a specific history of development 
(epigenesis).”31 More dramatically put, as Luria does: 
The fact that in the course of history man has developed 
new functions does not mean that each one relies on a 
new group of nerve cells […]. The development of new 
‘functional organs’ occurs through the development of 
new functional systems, which is a means for the 
unlimited development of cerebral activity. The human 
cerebral cortex, thanks to this principle, becomes an 
organ of civilization in which are hidden boundless 
possibilities.32 
He adds that  
Social history ties the knots that produce new 
correlations between certain zones of the cerebral 
cortex.33 
Now we begin to see something new, namely what I 
referred to as “the socialist cortex”: Aaron Zalkind declared 
(as quoted by Vygotski) that “The cortex is on a shared path 
with socialism, and socialism is on a shared path with the 
cortex.”34 A kind of avant-gardism! And Vygotski himself 
asserts that 
                                                           
29 Vygotski, Thinking and Speech, ch. 7, in Vygotski (1987), p. 
259. 
30 Métraux (ms.), § III. 
31 Zlatev (2001), p. 190. 
32 Luria (1967), in Luria (1978), p. 279. Luria is developing 
themes from Vygotski’s “Psychology and the Theory of the 
Localization of Mental Functions,” translated in Vygotski (1997). 
33 Luria (1967) in Luria (1978), p. 279. 
34 Aaron Zalkind (Bolshevik child psychologist), quoted in 
Vygotski, Pedologija Podrotska, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1929), p. 14; 
quoted in van der Veer & Valsiner (1991), p. 320. 
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History, changing the human type, depends on the 
cortex; the new socialist man will be created through 
the cortex; upbringing is in general an influence upon 
the cortex.35 
If this were a longer study it would useful at this point to 
look into the question of Vygotski’s Marxism. He rejected 
most of the attempts in his day to link Marxism to 
psychology – including, as we saw, one by Luria – as being 
inadequate and misconceived; his claim that human mental 
functions are irreducibly social does not have to be seen as 
per se derived from Marxism, although he connects himself 
to this tradition in many other ways, but from the French 
sociological tradition of Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, and 
Halbwachs.36 However, the claim that mind/brain must be 
understood as “the aggregate of internalized social 
functions,” once relations have become functions for the 
individual,37 is explicitly derived from Marx’s Sixth Thesis 
on Feuerbach: “Human essence in its reality is the sum of 
social relations.”38 Vygotski is seeking to put cerebral 
‘flesh’ onto the ontological ‘skeleton’ of the Marxian claim 
that we are defined at our core by the set of social relations 
to which we belong; he agrees with the broad ‘relational’ 
framework but seeks to give it some naturalistic basis in an 
account of the development of mind. 
Notice, however, that Vygotski’s ‘socialist cortex’ stands 
or falls as a concept without Marxist theory. We would be 
more likely today to speak of plasticity, of the effect of 
various ecological dimensions on cerebral development, 
including the role of maternal care in hippocampal plasticity 
(in young rats)39 and the effects of cortical microstimulation 
in “quantifying the relation between perception and 
neuronal activity” and thereby, “inducing a phenomenal 
state”40; more speculatively, instead of specifically calling 
the cortex the organ for socialism, we would point, 
following Terrence Deacon, to the manifestations in cortical 
architecture of our symbolic, linguistic, and even cultural 
life. We are a ‘symbolic species’, in Deacon’s phrase, not 
because symbols float around in our bloodstream, but 
because “symbols have played a major role in shaping our 
                                                           
35 Vygotski (1929), quoted in van der Veer & Valsiner (1991), p. 
320. 
36 In particular Halbwachs’ Cadres sociaux de la mémoire 
(1925), which stressed the ‘reconstructive’ dimension of memory; 
see Kozulin (1990), pp. 122-123. For a different view which 
emphasizes the Marxist dimension more strongly see Wertsch 
(1985), p. 58f., or Métraux’s comment that Vygotski’s “consistent 
Spinozist viewpoint” is also a “consistent Marxist viewpoint” 
(1992, p. 206). I find the latter reading a bit more convincing (see 
the image of the cortex and socialism) but it is clear that Vygotski, 
like Lukács, Althusser or Negri after him, has to invent a 
heterodox form of Marxism. 
37 Vygotski, “The genesis of higher mental functions,” in 
Wertsch, ed. (1981), p. 164. 
38 “das menschliches Wesen (…) in seiner Wirklichkeit ist das 
Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse.” 
39 Champagne, Bagot et al. (2008). 
40 Respectively, Romo, Hernández et al. (1998), pp. 387-388 
and Bickle & Ellis (2005), p. 159. 
cognitive capacities in ways that are complementary to their 
special functional demands”41; “language has given rise to a 
brain which is strongly biased to employ the one mode of 
associative learning that is most critical to it,”42 namely, 
“the most extensive modification to take place in human 
brain evolution, the expansion of the cerebral cortex, 
specifically the prefrontal cortex, reflects the evolutionary 
adaptation to this intensive working memory processing 
demand imposed by symbol learning.”43 Hence there is a 
‘co-evolution’ of language and the brain. We have learned 
since at least Walter Benjamin to recognize the historicity of 
perception; Luria recognized this through his experiments 
on visual illusions during trips to Uzbekistan in the 1930s; 
different subject groups, depending on their degree of 
Westernization, had a more or less high chance of seeing the 
illusions: “the more the subjects had dealt with abstract 
aspects of everyday practice, the less their vision was 
natural.”44 
The idea is that the brain itself, less in its ‘static’, 
anatomical being than in its ‘dynamic’, physiological being 
– in actu, then – displays features which reflect its 
embeddedness in or belonging to the social world. The 
externalist-Spinozist point to be derived from Deacon’s co-
evolution thesis is that we can only have knowledge about 
the inner states of others, and indeed, of our own, thanks to 
the overall structure of symbolic activity which (externally) 
exhibits the existence of such states, and further, creates the 
structure in which such states emerge. 
Most people don’t realize that Vygotski and Luria meant 
the brain itself when speaking about these dynamic, self-
transformative features; they usually describe these as 
belonging to mind or intellect. But Vygotski and Luria were 
materialists! (In both the Marxist sense that they believed in 
the primacy of productive activity over theory and 
intellectual activity in general, and the more naturalistic 
sense that they believed intellectual processes could be 
explainable in terms of, or at least in a causally integrated 
relation to, cerebral processes.45) The brain for them is no 
longer just an ‘organ’ mediating between mind and society, 
through language – not just a “physiological abstraction,” as 
Feuerbach put it.46 Extending from the social mind to the 
social brain is a major step towards, or for materialism. 
                                                           
41 Deacon (2003), p. 95. 
42 Deacon (1997), p. 336. 
43 Deacon (2003), p. 100. 
44 Métraux (ms.), § III. 
45 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for querying this and thus 
eliciting some clarification. There is no neat formulation which 
clarifies the relation between brain-mind materialism (and its 
complexities) and a more socially embedded materialism, in any of 
the authors discussed here; nor is this relation necessary. Vygotski 
and Luria, like Deacon (and Baldwin, Dewey and Negri in some of 
their moods) espouse both. 
46 Feuerbach, “Against the dualism of soul and body.” Compare 
Bergson’s (1896) image of the brain as the “bureau téléphonique 
central,” as a mere “intermediary” between sensations and 
motions” (pp. 26, 198) … which Vygotski finds too dualistic! 
(Vygotski [1997], p. 125). 
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However, neither neurally correlated social cognition nor 
even Machiavellian primates seem to display anything like 
the activity of the ‘socialist cortex’, our shorthand for the 
transformative dimension of the plastic, socially plastic 
brain.  For this we need not only Spinozist affects (along 
with his reduction of the universe to relations between 
portions of motion and rest), but a theory of transformation. 
Behind Vygotski and Negri, there is also Marx. 
3. The social brain 
As I mentioned at the outset, the notion of social brain 
appears in Marx’s Grundrisse, notebooks VI-VII. Marx 
writes about what he calls the “general productive forces of 
the social brain.”47 He suggests that, because of increasing 
use of automation and of developing networks of 
communication and transportation: 
… [T]he production process has ceased to be a labour 
process in the sense of a process dominated by labour as 
its governing unity. Labour appears rather as a 
conscious organ, scattered among the individual living 
workers at various points of the mechanical system; 
subsumed under the total process of the machinery 
itself, as itself only a link of the system, whose unity 
exists not in the living workers, but rather in the living 
(active) machinery, which confronts his individual, 
insignificant doings as a mighty organism.48 
A few pages later he remarks that 
… [N]ature builds no machines, no locomotives, 
railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules etc. 
These are products of human industry; natural material 
transformed into organs of the human will over nature, 
or of human participation in nature. They are organs of 
the human brain, created by the human hand; the power 
of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed 
capital indicates to what degree social knowledge has 
become a direct force of production, and to what 
degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social 
life itself have come under the control of the general 
intellect and been transformed in accordance with it.49 
What Marx is saying is that the real ‘operator’ or ‘agent’ 
of transformation, indeed the sole remaining actor in this 
process, is the social brain; it has become the productive 
force itself. “Rather than an allusion to the overcoming of 
the existent, the ‘Fragment’ is a sociologist’s toolbox and 
the last chapter of a natural history of society.”50 That is, it 
is meant as a description of empirical reality.51 The actor is 
neither the machines by themselves nor the old-fashioned 
humanist ‘autonomous rational animal’, but rather the 
‘General Intellect’, which resides both in humans and in 
                                                           
47 Marx (1973), p. 694. 
48 Ibid., p. 693. 
49 Ibid., p. 706, emphasis his own. 
50 Virno (2001b), section on “Marx, Simondon, Vygotski”; 
Marx (1973), p. 709. 
51 Virno (2001a), (2007). 
intelligent machines. Comparisons have been made52 
between this idea of ‘General Intellect’ and Teilhard de 
Chardin’s ‘noosphere’, and indeed there is something 
uncomfortably spiritualistic about the idea, as if intellect 
were more real than a piece of flesh or silicone. This may 
indeed be a Hegelian residue in Marx, a residue of ‘Geist’. 
If I am emphasizing the term ‘social brain’ here, it’s 
precisely to show that it’s part of the real (‘wet’ rather than 
‘dry’) natural world. Further, just because the brain is 
irreducibly social does not mean that it is an ‘empire within 
an empire’ or ‘kingdom within a kingdom’ (in Spinoza’s 
famous phrase from the Preface to Book III of the Ethics: 
imperium in imperio). I refer back to the Spinozist ontology 
of relations and find support in this also from Negri’s 
recurring invocations of ‘ontology’ as a political necessity.53 
The Spinozist brain, the social brain cannot be extracted 
or abstracted from this universe of relations (recall 
Vygotski’s arguments against Piaget’s ‘egocentric’ 
perspective). As such, it cannot or should not be confused 
– with the phenomenological outlook (‘Man thinks, not 
the brain’), or with Varela’s enactivist model, which is rich 
and full of possibilities but hardly socio-political ones; 
Varela is our Piaget, in a sense: a new idealist, a new 
metaphysically grounded solipsist for whom the Self is self-
positing, self-grounding rather than constituted in and 
through relation, or challenges of the ‘outside’, whether this 
is construed as a Darwinian environment or a Spinozist 
causal universe.54 
– with, at the other extreme, ‘good old-fashioned 
computational Artificial Intelligence’ (although Gallese’s 
work hints at a new, socially oriented understanding of the 
single neuron doctrine), because the social brain is both 
material (wetware rather than dryware) and other-directed; 
– with, lastly, the traditional distinction between natural 
sciences and human sciences, which its very name seeks to 
overcome. No distinction here between the brute, inanimate 
world of nature, animals and machines on the one hand and 
a free, spiritual world of self-interpreting Daseine on the 
other hand. Suffice it to recall here the charming formula 
Negri (1995) proposed for understanding Deleuze-Guattari’s 
Mille plateaux: that it was the last great work of the 
Geisteswissenschaften, but where Geist was replaced by the 
brain. 
In a sense, the novelty of the concept of social brain 
appears most striking in regard to the last item (which it is 
not), the hermeneutical self. If we recall that Vygotski’s 
concepts are born out of a reflection on linguistic 
development, and that the ‘affective’ dimension that both 
Vygotski, Negri and Virno draw out of Spinoza is ‘always 
already’ social – such that the general intellect itself is 
                                                           
52 Gere (2004). 
53 On the meaning of ‘ontology’ in Negri see Wolfe (2007a). 
54 Hence it is understandable that Luria was critical of Kurt 
Goldstein, another (brilliant) forerunner of Varela’s. See e.g. Luria 
(1967) in Luria (1978), p. 277. I elaborate this point with reference 
to the concept of organism in Wolfe (forthcoming). 
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permeated with the “linguistic cooperation of a multitude of 
living subjects”55 – we can see a bit better why the 
distinction between the natural and the ‘hermeneutical’ is of 
little use here. The potential of an agent is inseparable from 
what Negri calls the ‘set of prostheses’,56 essentially the 
possible set of scaffolding, networks and technological 
extensions of our perception, cognition and action.57 
The tool […] has entirely changed. We no longer need 
tools in order to transform nature [...] or to establish a 
relation with the historical world [...], we only need 
language. Language is the tool. Better yet, the brain is 
the tool, inasmuch as it is common.58 
One can see resonances here with the work both of Donna 
Haraway (with the focus on the category of prosthesis and 
the primacy of artificiality) and, surprisingly perhaps, of 
Richard Dawkins (specifically, the notion of ‘extended 
phenotype’, according to which the genes of an organism 
can be expressed beyond its immediate biological boundary 
– beavers’ dams, birds’ nests, but also the behavior of hosts 
infected by parasites; here, the border of the gene is no 
longer the skin).59 
The brain is “common” inasmuch as it is constituted by 
and inseparable from the network of relations to which we 
belong. What Spinoza’s common notions, Marx’s General 
Intellect and the Vygotskian ‘socialist cortex’ indicate is 
precisely this commonness, as opposed to the ‘classic’ idea 
of thinking as a solitary, contemplative activity. Given this 
commonness, there is no longer a separation between brain 
and tool as two distinct entities.60 Indeed, in his day 
Vygotski was attacked by Party psychologists for 
‘virtualizing’ the concept of tool or that of labor, and 
allowing for ‘mental’ factors such as culture to be 
determinations, rather than strict economic factors.61 
What this implies for current discussions of group 
cognition can only be hinted at briefly.62 First, there is no 
absolute ontological separation between an individual agent 
and her brain, and the total network of affects, objects and 
structures around her. Second, individuation is an effect of 
power, both in the Vygotskian sense that ‘I’ am a product of 
socialization, and not the other way round, and in the 
                                                           
55 Virno (2004). 
56Negri (2000), § 16b. These texts are also republished in Negri 
(2005). 
57 See the discussion of plasticity-remapping-‘cultured brain’ in 
Neidich (2003) for more on this aspect, and Wolfe (2007b); 
Neidich’s idea has its own potential for being restated as a new 
form of what phenomenologists call ‘self-affection’, just as 
Marxist-operaist General Intellect has a potential to be restated as 
Pure Mind: ultimate idealism. 
58 Negri (2000), § 16b. 
59 I thank Luc Faucher for the latter suggestion. 
60 Negri (2001), § 16bis, p. 84. 
61 A.A. Talankin, speaking at the First All-Union Congress on 
Psychotechnics and the Psychophysiology of Labor, Leningrad, 
1931. He also attacks Vygotski on the related charge of importing 
‘Western’ concepts from Freud and Gestalt theory into Soviet 
psychology. See van der Veer & Valsiner (1991), p. 377. 
62 Thanks to Georg Theile for querying this. 
Spinozist sense that the more ‘extensions’ I have – a 
notebook, a computer, a pen, a knot in my handkerchief, a 
friend’s telephone number, a Party membership card, and so 
forth – the greater my power of acting will be. Not just in a 
trivial sense of ‘greater influence’, but because (recall the 
idea of common notions) I will have more ideas of more 
bodies. Third, the social brain concept presented is 
definitely not reducible to the individual’s manifestations of 
a social world around her, since on the contrary (pace 
Vygotski, Deacon and others) cerebral architecture reflects, 
however minutely, forms of social, linguistic, cultural 
organization. Does the group then have a ‘group mind’? The 
foregoing discussion does not necessarily entail that. I have 
simply tried to show that there is a way of thinking about 
the brain which retains a socio-political dimension while at 
the same time dealing with naturalistically specifiable 
features of development; a genuinely materialist 
perspective. 
From the social dimension of mind – materialized through 
ethological and single-neuron studies, ontologically founded 
with the doctrine of common notions and of being as 
relation – through the fundamental plasticity of the brain 
and the remodelling by language and culture of the 
functional architecture of the cortex: this is the Spinozist 
tradition of the social brain. 
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